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AIDA, Mari
May 15, 2022
“For Now We See in a Mirror, Dimly”: Dialectical Wholeness in Oshii Mamoru’s Ghost
in the Shell
The year is 2029. Accompanied by a cacophony of multi-language radio
correspondence and beeping sounds, a holographic map of a city presents itself to us, glaring
neon-green against a pitch-black backdrop. As we zoom in on the map, the camera swerves
up in the direction of our prior vantage point. The green screen dissipates to reveal the source
of the noise, two police-owned helicopters flying away into the night sky. We are now
standing next to public security agent Major Motoko Kusanagi, who is wiretapping into a
conference between a number of foreign diplomats and a programmer. What is at stake is a
probable kidnapping incident, in which the government-affiliated programmer is about to be
abducted by an official from the Republic of Gabel, previously accused of infringing on
diplomatic law. Kusanagi, with the support of her colleagues from public security agency
Sector 9, is preparing to take down the Gabel representative by means of assassination. As
armed policemen from other sectors of the public security organization beleaguer the
diplomats, Kusanagi jumps from a rooftop and proceeds to shoot the representative from
outside the building. Bewildered policemen gather at the shattered windows, only to see an
optical camouflage-clad Kusanagi free falling and disappearing into the surrounding city
lights (see Fig.1 and 2).
As such, Oshii Mamoru’s 1995 animated film Ghost in the Shell starts off with a
scene from protagonist Motoko Kusanagi’s daily life as a cyborg police officer. The scene
establishes the basic premises of the world that Kusanagi inhabits. From the very beginning,
the CGI artwork informs the audience that the film is set in a society that utilizes advanced
networking technology as well as the fact that people have live access to such sophisticated
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information; the majority of the film’s characters are cyborgs albeit to different extents, and
the members of Sector 9 take advantage of their physical status to tap into these
infrastructures of information. The scene also clarifies Kusanagi’s position within this
landscape of networks and international crime. Kusanagi is the sole female-presenting
character to appear throughout these four initial minutes of the film; in other words, the
government’s diplomacy sectors and the vast majority of the police force are dominated by
men. For Kusanagi to suddenly appear in a male-dominated space of conflict and
singlehandedly solve the issue at hand means that she is a subversive figure in what still
seems to be a patriarchal society.
Positing such depictions of radically powerful female protagonists at the most
introductory sections of its narrative, the film seems to advocate for the revision of
conventional power structures, perhaps aligning itself with the political interests of second
and third wave feminism. However, I argue that the film ultimately works in precisely the
opposite direction via its containment of Kusanagi as a maternal figure in a pseudo-marital
relationship with the Puppet Master. Diegetically, the film seems to embody late 20th century
feminist projects of reimagining gender, but the cinematic and extradiegetic storytelling
involved in the film undermine such ambitious readings, neutering its protagonist’s political
potentials to complicate our understandings of our gendered, embodied existence.
This essay will explore the ways in which Ghost in the Shell constructs its central
cyborg figure, in order to provide a case study for one of the principal tenets of
cyberfeminism: that technology opens up for politically motivated theorists a realm of
prospects and consequences. In order to set the scene for the analysis of the film, I will
explore Donna J. Haraway’s post-humanist agenda, “A Manifesto for Cyborgs” (1985). In
this essay, Haraway describes the cyborg, an amalgamated entity of machine and organism,
as a figure that encapsulates our embodied existence in an increasingly technologizing

Aida

3

society. What Haraway sees in the image of the cyborg is its potential to call out for better
imaginations for who cyborgs are capable of being in the future; in other words, it compels
readers to engage in the political activity of scrapping (and carefully building) social
boundaries. Regarding this central tenet of Haraway’s manifesto, I ask in what ways
Kusanagi could or could not be an example of Harawayan cyborgs.
The overarching contention of this paper is that Kusanagi can in fact be understood as
such, but the narrative structure of the film is built in such a fashion that it puts the radical
cyborg in the conservative position of pursuing dialectical wholeness. In this film, the
cyborg, whose symbolic power is predicated on the plurality of her identity, is rendered
whole through her conjoinment with another force. This operation is three-fold: the film
codes its narrative conclusion, the mental amalgamation of Kusanagi and the Puppet Master,
in the language of mythology, heterosexual marriage, and psychoanalytic self-discovery. To
delineate the specifics of how the film disarms the cyborg as a metaphor for hybrid
subjectivities, I will consult Karen Cadora on her analysis of female characters in US
cyberpunk novels. Here, I lay out the premise that Kusanagi’s status as a cyborg does afford
her a certain freedom from oppressive social paradigms, in this case conventional
conceptions of femininity and its relationship to bodies. Then, I will discuss the ways in
which Kusanagi is subsequently contained in the rhetoric of wholeness by tracing the
narrative trajectory of the film. At its most successful, this analysis will attest for Haraway’s
less utopian yet equally important assertion, that in imagining future subjectivities, we also
risk the possibility of reinscribing the very boundaries that we seek to eradicate.

“A Manifesto for Cyborgs”: A Critique on Euro-American Epistemology
In “A Manifesto for Cyborgs,” Haraway provides a feminist agenda that challenges
the symbolic potency of the organic female body in feminist discourse, an attempt that she
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describes as blasphemous because of her irreverence towards the very image thought to unite
women in an all-encompassing if monolithic “women’s experience.” Positioning her project
against second wave feminism as “an ironic political myth” that nonetheless stays faithful to
its goals, she presents the cyborg as an alternative metaphor that better accounts for the
hybridized existence of contemporary individuals (324). Haraway’s argument is specific to
the late twentieth century, a point in history where technological advancements have exposed
the arbitrariness of what can be defined as human or non-human. She highlights three
important binaries that Euro-American scientific culture has fabricated in order to privilege
human existence over other entitiesーhuman versus animal, organism versus machine, and
physical versus non-physicalーall of which have been breached due to industrialization and
scientific progress. In such historical contexts, the cyborg serves as a versatile metaphor for
the very transgression of these constructed boundaries, a phenomenon that Haraway
encourages to embrace as a site of transformation and excitement as well as risk.
How this techno-scientifically oriented image of the cyborg also has the potential to
address issues of gender is coded within Haraway’s description of past trends in EuroAmerican feminist discourse. Early in her manifesto, Haraway states that the cyborg is a
post-gender being whose “replication is uncoupled from organic reproduction” (325). Here,
she distinguishes the cyborg from the organic human by highlighting reproduction, a bodily
factor that Western science has positioned as the determining aspect of what gender one is
assigned at birth. By describing the birth of cyborgs in terms of replication rather than
reproduction, Haraway breaks free of the Beauvoirian belief that our bodies are inherently
sexed in accordance to the type of reproductive organs that we possess.
Referencing more recent feminist texts, Haraway explains her stake in second wave
feminism as a counterpoint to ecofeminism, a strain of feminism that privileges nature as
opposed to artifacts. In the concluding section to her article, Haraway critiques Susan Griffin,
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Audre Lorde, and Adrienne Rich by underscoring their rhetorical reliance on the organic as
opposed to the technological (343). What Haraway seems to mean by “the organic” are
bodies, the identities of which these scholars validate and differentiate from one another
based on the purported “naturalness” of said bodies . Then, Haraway’s cyborg undermines
the rhetorical power of the organic body, and in this context the organic female body
specifically, to assert its innate authenticity, because it is a reminder of the fact that the onceindependent categories of organism and technology have already begun to cross-contaminate.
However, this is not to say that Haraway’s aim is to legitimize her project by pitting her
theoretical frameworks against those of preeminent feminists; rather, she explains that her
political aims as a feminist are congruent with the ones upheld by the three writers. Sketching
out a joint project of imagining hybrid identities, she advocates for a feminism that will
account for the multi-faceted realities of women living under racism and misogyny.
For the purposes of this essay, it is important to note the technicalities of Haraway’s
comparison between her own technophilic cyberfeminism and spiritual ecofeminism,
implemented through the juxtaposition of cyborgs and goddesses. If Haraway’s metaphor for
a technoscientifically hybridized identity is a cyborg, her alternate metaphor for spiritual
ecofeminism is the goddess, which is fitting considering its long-term role as a “common
landmark” for feminists looking “toward a return to ‘the natural’” (Lykke 23). While
subsequent writings on Haraway’s manifesto identify these two figures as symbols standing
in for two different schools of feminism, Haraway herself aligns the goddess with Biblical
narratives of an original wholeness to which the goddess must ultimately return.
This comparison between goddesses and Biblical ideology necessitates elaboration on
why exactly Haraway puts the goddess in such a parallel. This is especially so because
Haraway's critique of wholeness is encapsulated in her rejection of the goddess; she ends the
“Manifesto” with the assertion that “she would rather be a cyborg than a goddess” (349).
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Haraway enunciates throughout the “Manifesto” that her cyborg stands in opposition to the
goddess and associates the latter with wholeness, but how exactly? What does she mean by
wholeness anyway?
Haraway unravels her critique of wholeness in short segments that she disperses
across the “Manifesto”. In her first problematization of the term, she writes:
The cyborg is a creature in a post-gender world; it has no truck with bisexuality, preOedipal symbiosis, unalienated labor, or other seductions to organic whole-ness
through a final appropriation of all the powers of the parts into a higher unity. In a
sense, the cyborg has no origin story in the Western sense; [a story which] depends on
the myth of original unity, fullness, bliss and terror, represented by the phallic mother
from who all humans must separate, the task of individual development and of
history, the twin potent myths inscribed most powerfully for us in psychoanalysis and
Marxism. (325)
For Haraway, narratives of original wholeness are a locus of subordination in which
fragmentedーthat is, deriving from multiple originsーsubjectivities are rendered damaged or
incomplete. Her usage of the term “fragmented,” as opposed to her alternative terminology
“hybrid,” underscores the pervasiveness of the assumption that the normal state of subjectivity
is singular; if one assumes multiple identities, one’s identity is broken into fragments that
collectively represent its plurality. Haraway identifies these narratives in psychoanalysis and
Marxism, two of the most influential schools of thought to influence Euro-American academic
discourse. Thus, her “Manifesto” is not only a critique of preceding trends in US feminism, but
also of the general trajectory that Western academia has taken.
Haraway's association of goddesses with Biblical narratives can be understood in terms
of her explication of Christianity, especially in relation to the persistent patterns identifiable in
Euro-American epistemology. She suggests that in addition to the two examples raised above,
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Christianity is yet another example of narratives that promote a return to the allegedly
primordial state of wholeness. While not explicitly stated, critiques of Biblical narratives are
coded into the “Manifesto” through its veneration of cyborgs as a postmodern being:
The relationships for forming wholes from parts, including those of polarity and
hierarchical domination, are at issue in the cyborg world. Unlike the hopes of
Frankenstein’s monster, the cyborg does not expect its father to save it through a
restoration of the garden; i.e., through the fabrication of a heterosexual mate, through
its completion in a finished whole, a city and cosmos. The cyborg does not dream of
community on the model of the organic family, this time without the Oedipal project.
The cyborg would not recognize the Garden of Eden; it is not made of mud and cannot
dream of returning to dust. (326)
Clearly, Haraway is establishing parallels between psychoanalysis and the Bible; both the
phallic mother and the Garden of Eden represent an original state of being that becomes lost
through the acquisition of knowledge. In accordance with her critique of wholeness earlier in
the “Manifesto”, she positions the cyborg as the figure that could potentially lead EuroAmerican academic discourse out of its epistemological quagmire.
When Haraway juxtaposes the goddess to the Biblical god, she is referring not so
much to the myriad goddesses as they stand in actual mythologies as to the goddess as the
symbol of spiritual ecofeminism. In one of her few direct references to the goddess, Haraway
writes that with the rapid acceleration of technoscientific advancements in the 20th century,
“We cannot go back ideologically or materially. It’s not just that “god” is dead; so is the
goddess” (335). In establishing the analogy between the death of “god,” the marker of a
substantial ideological shifts, and that of the “goddess,” the signifier of material changes, she
suggests that the goddess in this context is the one worshipped by feminists advocating for an
eco-friendly politics. Noteworthy is the language used to explain their agenda. Introducing the
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heated debate between cyberfeminists and ecofeminists, Nina Lykke describes the general
trajectory of spiritual ecofeminists as endeavoring “toward a return to ‘the natural’” (23, italics
mine). Lykke’s diction suggests that in positioning “the natural” as the ideal origin to strive
towards, ecofeminism reinstates the binary between nature and artificiality. Hence Haraway’s
dismissal of goddesses: they are conjured on the narrative of wholeness, and its by-product,
the hierarchical binary between nature and artifice, that she seeks to escape.
Haraway’s rejection of goddesses, in turn, establishes the significance of cyborgs as a
metaphorical vehicle of escape. Haraway’s association between cyborgs and science fiction
situates the figure largely in the near future, thus making them a point of inquiry for
reimagining the sociopolitical boundaries that are so central to the construction of our own
identities. By anchoring the cyborg in fiction as opposed to our immediate environments,
Haraway successfully portrays the cyborg as a figure that will aid our imaginations as we
write our own manifestos for the future. As Haraway states, “who cyborgs will be is a radical
question”; this is so because the material yet-to-be-here-ness of the cyborg encourages us to
envision the most utopian version of how they/we could manifest themselves/ourselves and
shape society accordingly (327). At the same time, this capacity for sociopolitical
reimagination means that we also risk the possibility of further entrenching oppressive social
norms through picturing the cyborgs. Addressing this two-fold potential of the figure,
Haraway calls for responsible negotiations between scientific technology and its social
implications in order to productively reconfigure social boundaries.

Will the Real Cyborg Please Stand Up? Kusanagi as a Harawayan Cyborg
Haraway’s production of “an ironic political myth” instigated in feminist discourse
and science fiction studies a search for the Harawayan cyborg, the subversive icon that would
aid and nourish our reimaginations of a hybridized identity (324). For some scholars, this
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search proved to be utterly unfruitful. In her survey of cyborg representations dating from
Frankenstein (1818, Shelley) to RoboCop (1987, Verhoeven), Anne Balsamo goes so far as
to refute the central tenet of Haraway’s manifesto, that cyborgs call forth a skepticism
towards and a consequent restructuring of social boundaries, such as those of gender. For
Balsamo, cyborgs are already present in the archives of science fiction, and in a deeply
gendered way at that; therefore, cultural representations of cyborgs reproduce restrictive
gender stereotypes rather than destabilize them. Reflecting on her cynical commentary on
preexisting depictions of cyborgs, she concludes that in order to honor fiction as a potential
site of feminist identity production, “we need to search for cyborg images which work to
disrupt stable oppositions” (156). Twenty-five years from the initial publication of Balsamo’s
article, this continues to be an ongoing search due to the unfaltering popularity of cyborgs in
science fiction, and more specifically, in the context of this essay, one wonders if Ghost in
the Shell is home to such figures.
In some regards, Kusanagi, whose cyborg subjectivity the film explores through her
interactions with the Puppet Master incident, can be described as the very cyborg that
Balsamo seeks in science fiction. Karen Cadora’s reading of US cyberpunk novels is
enlightening here. In her article “Feminist Cyberpunk,” Cadora identifies a female-oriented
undercurrent in the mostly hypermasculine cyberpunk tradition. By “tradition,” Cadora
means the line of science fiction novels that was written or inspired by the contributors of the
cyberpunk movement, the most frequently cited authors of which are William Gibson, Bruce
Sterling, Lewis Shiner, John Shirely, and Rudy Rucker (Murphy 15). In a supportive if
exclusive environment, they collectively generated the sci-fi subgenre later recognized as
cyberpunk, identifiable by their thematic occupation with two different kinds of invasions:
“body invasion,” which refer to the varying levels of body modification ranging from
cosmetic surgery to genetic modification, and “mind invasion,” the umbrella term for
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technology that challenges the dichotomy between humans and machines (Murphy 18).
While these characteristics call to mind the “Manifesto” in its attentiveness to transgressed
boundaries, the genre itself is uninterested in advocating for Haraway’s political investments.
On the contrary, it has been criticized for its thematic alliance with ’80s conservatism, more
specifically its veneration of the individualistic American male who “employs his particular
performative mastery against a demonized and feminized Other” (Nixon 226). Contrary to its
authors’ description of the genre as the political cutting edge of science fiction, this line of
early cyberpunk is conservative in its ultimate promotion of male-centered, white American
hegemony.
Cadora similarly castigates the genre for its unfulfilled promises of subversive
narratives, but her overriding interest is to locate in cyberpunk a potential for feminist
interventions. Rebutting earlier dismissals of the cyberpunk genre as an inherent boys’ club,
Cadora addresses certain novels, mainly those written in the late 80’s and 90’s, that deviate
from heteronormative narratives of male cyberpunks whose expertise is to penetrate and
exercise control over a feminized computer matrix. A topic that she raises as part of this
project is the status of bodies in feminist cyberpunk novels, that is, the female protagonists of
these novels are often tasked with confronting their embodiedness in ways that the characters
of traditional cyberpunk novels are not. In particular, many impoverished female characters
turn to prostitution or surrogate motherhood in order to provide for their own sustenance, and
are thus tethered to their organic bodies (364). These characters, however, are not the main
protagonists of these novels; the protagonists, on the other hand, devise alternative methods
of survival by exercising their techno-scientific competency. Therefore, Cadora implies that
these feminist cyberpunk novels simultaneously address issues of class and intersectionality
while positing technology as a potential stepping-stone to liberation.
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Arguably, Ghost in the Shell follows a similar trajectory by characterizing Kusanagi
as a female-identifying cyborg who evades oppression through her technological and
combative expertise. Throughout the film, Kusanagi is shown engaging in cybernetic
espionage and hand-to-hand combat as part of her duties as a public security agent, both
activities of which are enabled by Kusanagi’s bodily status as an entirely cyborgized
individual. It is implied early on in the film that Kusanagi’s occupation affords her financial
independence from her family or partner, if such are present at all. At the end of the opening
credits, we get a brief view of Kusanagi’s apartment where she presumably lives alone (see
Fig.3). Visible from her window is a panorama of her residing city, the picturesqueness of
which suggests her capacity to afford living in a coveted area. In short, Kusanagi’s cyborg
body enables her to flourish professionally and financially, and this apparent celebration of
the mechanical female body disrupts the all-too-common dichotomy between man-made
masculinity and nature-oriented femininity.

Towards a Dialectical Wholeness: Psychoanalysis, Mythology, and Marriage in Ghost in
the Shell
Despite the film’s positioning of the cyborg body as the source of independence, it
doubly depicts it as the source of anxiety. In fact, the driving narrative of the film, Kusanagi’s
identity crisis, is predicated on the conditions of her own body. Furthermore, perhaps not
surprisingly, the events leading up to the film’s conclusion are punctuated with
psychoanalytic imagery that visually conveys Kusanagi’s yearning for an ontologically
stable, singular identity.
In one of the first possible references to psychoanalysis, the film provides at the end
of its opening credits an extreme close-up of Kusanagi’s face as she wakes up in her own
apartment (see Fig.4). Positioned in the lower left corner of the shot is her right hand, the
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forefronting of which draws attention to the fact that Kusanagi is looking at it. In this
miniscule sequence, Kusanagi opens her eyes, identifies her right hand, flexes it, and sits up
on her mattress over a span of approximately eight seconds. This section of the film is
radically slow-paced compared to the opening credits, which depicts Kusanagi undergoing
maintenance, presumably following the mission depicted at the beginning of the film. Then,
it seems that the film places special emphasis on Kusanagi’s gesture of staring at her hand.
I argue that this specific detail of the film evokes Lacanian psychoanalysis because it
closely resembles “hand regard,” a term used to describe infants’ recognition of their own
hands. This occurs at around two or three months of age, a period in which infants begin to
understand their embodied selves by interacting with their own bodies (Rochat 39). The
concept harks back to the Lacanian mirror stage, as it similarly situates in early stages of
child development the identification of an embodied selfhood.
Moreover, the film situates the hand regard sequence immediately after metaphorical
childbirth, tracing early stages of child development. Of importance here are the opening
credits of the film, which depict Kusanagi under maintenance in a spectacle of CGI and
gratuitous nudity1. In this sequence, Kusanagi is not so much fixed as rebuilt from her bare
bones; the step-by-step exposition of the repairing process reveals the cyborgian materiality
of Kusanagi’s “shell,” the film’s vocabulary for an artificial body to which users can tether
their minds or “ghosts”. In one of the last procedures made to her body, Kusanagi is thrown
into a tankful of liquid, in which she floats in a rough approximation of the fetal position (see
Fig.5 and 6). Elevated out of the pool to dry, Kusanagi is reborn into subsequent
consciousness and therefore must rediscover her newly replicated body. Thus, the film places

1

In his comparative reading of Ghost in the Shell and the “Manifesto,” Carl Silvio discusses

the film’s complicity with the male gaze.
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Kusanagi’s re-identification with her own body directly after her rebirth, effectively
recreating the developmental trajectory described by Lacan.
Consider, for a moment, how strange the film’s apparent references to psychoanalysis
are. Why would it make sense to employ psychoanalytic imagery to tell a story about
cyborgs, when the theory was originally consulted upon to explain the physiological
conditions of organic humans? My answer to this question is because the conceptual
underpinnings of psychoanalysis outline what Euro-American scientific traditions once
defined as the normative human experience, and drawing on them allows the film to highlight
Kusanagi’s problematization of her own hybrid status. Haraway identifies in the phallic
mother a narrative of an original wholeness and a flawed subjectivity that is inadvertently
separated from it, but I argue that Lacanian mirror stage also comprises such narratives. For
Lacan, the mirror stage is a site of identification and alienation; an infant recognizes their
body as a unified whole through their identification with the mirror image, but in so doing
becomes alienated from their fragmented body when the image comes to replace the self. In
other words, “the sense of a unified self is acquired at the price of this self being an-other,
that is, our mirror image” (Homer 25). While not built on the idea of a primordial wholeness,
Lacan’s ideas pertaining to the mirror stage suggest an inherently flawed human existence
that wishes for and (mis)identifies with something more complete. Arguably, in its evocation
of Lacanian psychoanalysis, the film nonetheless signals its holistic undertones from its very
beginning.
The film begins to more concretely problematize the hybridity of cyborg bodies
through the Puppet Master incident, in which an anonymous culprit manipulates cyborg
civilians by hacking them, reducing them to not much more than a life-size puppet (therefore
the moniker “the Puppet Master”). According to the logic of the film, cyborgs are
ontologically vulnerable because their cybernetically wired bodies make their minds
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increasingly susceptible to external threats. This threat is embodied by the Puppet Master,
who targets and incapacitates three victims, all of whom Kusanagi meets in person after they
have been attacked.
Perhaps the most significantly harmed of the three, the final victim presents
possibilities of mind invasion in the film’s description of his ill-fated life journey. The final
victim is a garbage truck driver who believes himself to have acquired spyware from the
second. The film describes the character’s motivation for circulating the presumably
spyware-laden floppy disk around the city in detail; he explains that he is attempting to
reconnect with his estranged wife and daughter. However, investigations led by Sector 9
reveal that memories of his immediate family are in fact mere illusions, the product of the
Puppet Master’s modifications to his externalized memory. By detailing this incident in the
first thirty minutes of its narrative, the film encourages audiences to understand cyborg
bodies through an unfortunate case study that suggests a correlation between cyborgization
and the threat to individual subjectivity. In this context, the hybridity of cyborg bodies is not
so much a site of reimagination as an issue to be resolved.
In a pivotal scene following the exposition of the Puppet Master’s offenses, Kusanagi
confirms that she is undergoing an existential crisis, thus defining the narrative scope of the
film; it is about Kusanagi’s search for a more stable version of herself. Here, Kusanagi is
shown scuba diving in the city’s adjacent inlet, the composition of which also brings to mind
the Lacanian mirror stage (see Fig.7). In a subsequent conversation with her colleague Batou,
who suggests that she retire if her occupation is so mentally taxing she can only destress via
the potentially life-threatening activity of diving, she says:
草薙：人間が人間であるための部品が決して少なくないように、自分が自分であるため
には驚くほど多くのものが必要なの。…あたしの電脳がアクセスできる膨大な情報や
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ネットの広がり、それら全てがあたしの一部であり、あたしという意識そのものを生み
出し、そして同時に、あたしをある限界に制約し続ける...
KUSANAGI. In the same way there are so many parts to what makes a human human,
there’s a surprising number of things that I need in order to be myself… The vast
amount of information and the expanse of the internet that my cybernetics allow me
access to―these are all part of me, they produce the conscience that is me, and at the
same time, they confine me to a certain breaking point.2 (31:41-32:18)
Kusanagi’s comments on the necessity of her own corporeal environment is a reference to her
institutional relationship with her own body. According to Kusanagi, her current shell is a
high-end model afforded to her by Sector 9 as a professional equipment she can and must
wear at all times. In the case of retirement, she would be obliged to return her own body to
the government as well as have classified information erased from her memory. However,
Kusanagi feels that the physical and informatic mobility that her shell enables her has come
to define who she is as an individual. She is in a double bind where her embodied identity is
bound to her occupation as a public security officer, the duties of which reveal to her just
how dubious the concept of cyborg subjectivity is. For Kusanagi, this navigation between the
potential risks of cybernetic technology and her own identification with it registers as a state
of crisis, something she wishes to evade.
Ghost in the Shell becomes increasingly vocal in its objection to fragmentation as it
progresses towards its climax, in which Kusanagi inadvertently merges with the Puppet
Master and becomes a cybernetic life form of her own. Leading up to the climax is the
sudden revelation that the Puppet Master is in fact not an unidentified cyber terrorist, but

2

All translations are mine unless otherwise indicated.
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rather a self-proclaimed organism made of mass data. If the film has already discussed the
broken dichotomy between organism and machine through its depictions of cyborgs, the
Puppet Master presents and embodies the latter counterpart of Haraway’s third binary, that of
the material and the immaterial.
How the Puppet Master straddles the material/immaterial binary is evident in the
film’s audiovisual depictions of the character. The first physical manifestation of the Puppet
Master occurs in a scene at what seems to be a Sector 9 affilated lab. As Batou summarizes,
Sector 9 is currently inspecting a shell that has escaped from a factory owned by the leading
shell manufacturer Megatech Inc. following a hacking incident that has caused the factory
line to start producing shells on its own. The destroyed cyborg torso that sits before them
allegedly houses an original ghost in its cognitive system, and it is precisely this ghost that
turns out to be the Puppet Master. What is important to note here is that the blonde torso that
houses the character is consistently present in the film until its ultimate annihilation during its
climax. The film continues to provide a material representation of the Puppet Master, despite
the fact that he makes his very first appearance as an intangible, invisible being, quite literally
as if he were a ghost haunting Kusanagi. The Puppet Master emerges for the first time during
the aforementioned scene on the dive boat. Kusanagi and Batou’s debate is interrupted by an
anonymous voice reciting a section from the First Epistle to the Corinthians. The film
suggests after the climax that this voice belonged to the Puppet Master, who at the time did
not have access to a material body to reside in. While providing an instantly recognizable
visual marker for the character, the film also signals that he exists outside of his corporeal
presence through the employment of such audio effects.
Interestingly, the Puppet Master’s double status as material and immaterial being does
not conflate these supposedly binary modes of existence. Rather, the film reinforces the
dichotomization of these two ideas by mapping them onto the Christian binary of the body
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and the soul. The title of the film, which it shares with the original manga series by Shirow
Masamune, is named after Gilbert Ryle’s description of the Cartesian dualism of mind and
body, famously stated in his 1949 book Concept of Mind. While Ryle employs this
comparison in order to delineate the faultiness of Descartes’s conceptualization of the human
mind (Britannica), the Ghost in the Shell franchise collectively appropriates the key phrase
from Ryle’s book in order to render, acritically, a world in which “ghosts” inhibit the
machine that is the “shell.“ Accordingly, the Puppet Master’s seemingly effortless transition
from one body to another mirrors the Cartesian and associatively Christian assumption that
the mind and body are in a relationship where the former inhibits the latter without their
boundaries ever being breached.
The film’s sustained preservation of the material/immaterial dichotomy is crucial to
my reading of its climax. To provide a more detailed overview of the events that occur within
this specific section of the film, and to contextualize it within the film’s earlier
foreshadowing of an international diplomacy crisis: after the Puppet Master asserts his
existence as a cybernetic lifeform to the members of Sector 9, he is kidnapped by the
members of Sector 6, the public security agency’s foreign diplomacy team. It turns out that
the Puppet Master had emerged from an illegal espionage program created by a Sector 6
affiliated programmer, and faced with the Puppet Master’s conspicuous attacks on foreign
government officials, they are now motivated to expunge all evidence of their attempt at
spying. Kusanagi, while attempting to arrest the Sector 6 kidnappers for assault, also hopes to
converse with the Puppet Master to resolve her mysterious sense of kinship with the figure.
When Kusanagi convinces Batou to wire her to the kidnapped torso, the Puppet Master seizes
control over Kusanagi’s shell and explains that his goal had been to reach Kusanagi and
merge with her, after which the Puppet Master would achieve mortality and reproductive
capabilities. Before Kusanagi has a chance to make a choice, enemy aircraft start firing at
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them and the two unite just in time to avoid complete erasure. They lose their bodies, but in
turn achieve a new form of immaterial existence, symbolized by the image of what seems to
be a falling angel (see Fig.7).
Of importance here is the film’s elaborate side-stepping of broken binaries. Prior to
this point in the film, Kusanagi expresses her anxieties about the embodied precarity of her
own subjectivity, but her sudden conglomeration with the Puppet Master
consequently enables her to abandon her own shell, the site of worrisome crosscontaminations between organism and machine, self and other. Furthermore, the film
positions her next getaway, the realm of immateriality, in a stable binary against materiality.
The climax and following resolution of the film thus carries Kusanagi from a state of
contested hybridity to singular security. The narrative conclusions of the film, therefore,
avoids the question of fragmented subjectivity rather than let Kusanagi arrive at her own
answers.
Additionally, the film frames its refusal of hybrid subjectivities in imagery that signal
a return to the original state of wholeness. In part, this is accomplished through the usage of
Biblical motifs as alluded to earlier. Susan Napier further confirms the film’s heavy reliance
on biblical and mythical motifs. Drawing on a comparison between the film and its
cyberpunk and neo-noir precursor Blade Runner (Scott, 1982), Napier decodes the
complicated, overloaded plot of Ghost in the Shell as a story structured around four “falls.”
According to Napier, these falls are comparable to the biblical falls of the fallen angels in the
protagonists’ shared desires to find spiritual meaning in life. Napier also points to Buddhist
and Shintoist motifs embedded in the film by comparing the final amalgamation of Kusanagi
and the Puppet Master to the Buddhist state of Nirvana or the Shintoist tale of Amaterasu the
Sun Goddess, the latter of which Oshii confirms in a 1996 interview. Whereas Haraway
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asserts that she would rather become a cyborg than be a goddess, Kusanagi becomes the
goddess, thus reversing the “Manifesto”’s rallying cry for hybridity.
In a slightly overlapping approach, the film also employs the vocabulary of marriage
in order to signify Kusanagi’s return to a dialectical wholeness. Preexisting writings on the
film discuss this in terms of reproduction; for example, Carl Silvio discusses the film’s
depiction of Kusanagi as a maternal figure whose partially organic body serves as a vehicle
through which the Puppet Master produces his own offspring. As Silvio confirms in his
article, this idea of Kusanagi as a maternal figure (as opposed to a paternal one, for example)
is strange, because if she were a post-gender being as posited by Haraway’s “Manifesto,” the
attribution of any sort of gender onto Kusanagi would be solely arbitrary. The reasons as to
why the Puppet Master should regard Kusanagi as a “specifically feminine corporeality” is
not supported by the diegetic realities of Kusanagi’s life, but rather by the formalistic aspects
of the film set up to render Kusanagi as the object of the audience’s gaze (68). Additionally,
Silvio critiques the Puppet Master’s description of how exactly their procreation will take
place. During his conversation with Kusanagi at the film’s climax, the Puppet Master asks
her to “bear [his] offspring onto the net itself,”3 a strange statement considering how the
immaterial conditions of their new existence cannot be accounted for by the material notion
of “bearing” life (68). Then, during its climax, the film projects the familiar narrative of
motherhood onto the cyborg, undermining their capacity to break free of the societal
obligations inscribed onto organic flesh. The film, while providing Kusanagi with a way to
opt out of her corporeal existence, also reinscribes the supposed centrality of her corporeal
existence by characterizing her as a maternal body.

3

Translation by Carl Silvio.
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Intriguingly, Oshii describes these depictions of reproduction within the film as a
“marriage” rather than what the characters understand it to be, whether it be an attempt at
cross-generational survival or a way to transcend material existence. While not explicitly
stated in the narrative of the film itself, Oshii communicates this idea via the film’s main
musical theme, “謡,” or “Chant” in English. The lyrics are:
吾が舞えば
麗し女酔いにけり
吾が舞えば
照る月響むなり
夜這いに神天下りて
夜は明け
鵺鳥鳴く
遠神恵賜
遠神恵賜
遠神恵賜
When I dance, the beautiful maiden becomes drunk. When I dance, the shining moon
echoes. On this wedding day, gods will descend from the heavens and the night bird
will sing at dawn. The distant gods shall bless us.
This song makes two appearances in the film, firstly during the film’s opening credits
and later during an interlude halfway into the film, when the “camera,” so to speak, cuts to
different areas of the city for over three minutes (4:06-8:22, 32:52-36:20). Because both the
opening credits and the interlude show Kusanagi in action, one is inclined to think that the
吾, or the “I” of the main theme’s lyrics, refers to her. However, considering the climax,
these lyrics could also be interpreted as subtle foreshadowing: that the mental amalgamation

Aida

21

of Kusanagi and the Puppet Master signals the advent of a god-like figure that reigns in a
higher order. Importantly, this final merging is referred to as a 夜這い (yobai), which refers
to a medieval form of courtship or the marriage that results from it.
Furthermore, in a 1996 interview with cultural critic Ueno Toshiya and screen writer
Ito Kazunori, Oshii reveals that he had originally envisioned the film’s climax to resemble a
Christian wedding.
押井：もともとはもっとロマンチックになるはずだったんです。ロマンチックなものを目
指してみようと思ったし、結局はラブロマンスだから、教会も欲しいなと思ったのと、博
物館を教会に見立てられるんじゃないかと思って、あと狙撃してる時に最後の一撃
で装甲板が鳴り響いて鐘が鳴るっていう。
Oshii, on Kusanagi’s confrontation with the Puppet Master: Originally, [the scene]
was supposed to be more romantic. I wanted to try something romantic, and because
this film is a romance after all, I wanted there to be a church.4 I also thought I could
make the museum stand in for a sort of church and make the last bullet bouncing off
the armor plate the wedding bell. (Oshii 72)

4

The association between church and romance may not be obvious to the English-speaking

reader, because the relative ubiquity of Christian institutions within Anglophone cultures
associates church with many different aspects of life. In Japan, however, there is a strong
cultural association between churches, Catholic and Protestant, and marriage. In a survey
held by Recruit Holdings, the respondents of which were some 3,596 readers of the wedding
magazine Zexy who had held wedding ceremonies between April 2020 and March 2021,
51.5% answered that they held Christian weddings, the other common options being
Shintoist, civil, and Buddhist weddings (116). At the same time, only 1% of the Japanese
population describes themselves as holding Christian beliefs as of 2021 (Agency for Cultural
Affairs, 35). These numbers outline a situation in which the Japanese public comes into
contact with Christianity and its spatial venue, the church, only through wedding ceremonies.
Hence Oshii’s equation of heterosexual romance and church.
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To contextualize what Oshii is discussing here, there are three parties involved in this scene:
the Puppet Master, the Sector 9 agents including Kusanagi and Batou, and personnel from
Sector 6 who have taken the immobile Puppet Master to an abandoned museum in order to
eradicate him and died in the process. Kusanagi and the Puppet Master negotiate, and at the
very last moment implement, their unification as Sector 6 aircraft arrive above the museum
and start firing at the building, architecture and all, in order to assassinate the Puppet Master.
The film reveals evidence that Oshii realized this idea. Of particular interest are the
sound effects used at the moment of the shooting. When the film cues a shot of the blonde
torso being destroyed by gunfire, it represents the force of the artillery not only through
explosive sound effects, but also via a louder sound comparable to that of a large bell. This
shot in fact depicts the death of Kusanagi as she was previously known to her colleagues,
because shortly after she is wired to the torso, the Puppet Master dislocates his and
Kusanagi’s respective ghosts to switch bodies. The blonde temporary shell has been
annihilated and so has Kusanagi’s usual shell. Then, this shot represents a point of no return
in which Kusanagi’s two modes of existence, mind and body, have been destroyed, and she
can only survive by means of merging with the Puppet Master. If, as explained in the
interview, the sound effects outlined here are designed to evoke Christian marriage, the film
indeed likens the amalgamation of the two characters to a wedding ceremony.
Now, I return to a section of the “Manifesto” in which Haraway declares that cyborgs,
in all their hybrid, ungendered corporeality, do not achieve completion through heterosexual
coupling. She writes that “unlike the hopes of Frankenstein’s monster, the cyborg does not
expect its father to save it through a restoration of the garden; i.e., through the fabrication of a
heterosexual mate, through its completion in a finished whole, a city and cosmos” (326).
Here, Haraway refers to Frankenstein’s monster, who famously threatens his creator Victor
Frankenstein to create a female monster like himself so that he can live in the company of a
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heterosexual mate. As Haraway identifies, this plot point exemplifies a narrative pattern in
which characters are “saved” through their involvement in a heterosexual relationship. The
narrative trajectory of the film parallels this in uncanny similarity. In the same way that it
depicts post-amalgamation Kusanagi as a transcendental figure in the language of mythology
and the Bible, the film opposes the “Manifesto” by making Kusanagi do precisely what the
“Manifesto” says she will not do: find solace in heterosexual coupling.
In the final section of the film in which post-amalgamation Kusanagi reflects on her
new status as a material and immaterial cybernetic being, she expresses a matter-of-fact
acceptance of the changes that took place in the aftermath of the Puppet Master incident. This
occurs at Batou’s safehouse, where he has restored Kusanagi using a shell of a young girl he
acquired at the black market. When Batou asks whether or not the Puppet Master currently
resides within Kusanagi, she answers that he is asking the wrong question.
草薙：いつか海の上で聞いた声、覚えている？あの言葉の前にはこんなくだりがあるの。
「童の時は語ることも童の如く、思うことも童の如く、論ずることも童のごとくなりしが、
人となりては童のことを捨てたり。」ここには人形使いと呼ばれたプログラムも少佐と
呼ばれた女もいないわ。
KUSANAGI. Do you remember that voice we heard when we were out at sea? There’s a
preceding phrase to those words. ‘When I was a child, I spoke as a child, I understood
as a child, I thought as a child; but when I became a man, I put away childish things.’5
Neither the program called the Puppet Master nor the woman called Major exist
anymore.” (1:16:28-1:16:56)
Then, following a short discussion on future rendezvous, Kusanagi embarks on her indefinite
journey into the internet, buoyantly wondering where to go next.

5

Translations from the New King James Version.
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Implicit in Kusanagi’s remarks is the belief that her transition into a transcendental
being is not a mere transformation but an elevation. Here, Kusanagi quotes the Puppet Master
in his invocation of the First Letter to the Corinthians. The 11th verse of Chapter 13, cited
above, establishes a clear distinction between child and man by describing the narrator’s
metamorphosis into manhood, at which point he relinquishes childish things. In this context,
maturity is framed as a direct extension of childhood in a narrative of linear progress; once
one enters manhood, there is no going back; one can only grow older and wiser. This joint
narrative of progress and irreversible change cofunction to connote ascension. Quoting this
verse, Kusanagi maps the relationship between child and man onto the one between her past
and present selves, implying that she is more satisfied with her current status than her last.
If Kusanagi expresses her contentment through the quotation of the Bible, the film
similarly utilizes Biblical passages to fortify its conclusion that Kusanagi’s incorporation into
a wholeness is indeed a form of salvation. Of importance is the verse following the
aforementioned one, which the then-immaterial Puppet Master recites to Kusanagi and Batou
as they discuss cyborg ontology on a dive boat.
人形使い：今我ら鏡以てみる如く見るところ朧なり…
PUPPET MASTER. For now we see in a mirror, dimly6… (32:28-32:26)
The Puppet Master trails off mid-sentence, but in its entirety, the verse posits a juxtaposition
between the compromised state of things, represented through a mirror, and a subsequent
state of clarity which will bring about greater wisdom: “for now we see in a mirror, dimly,
but then face to face. Now I know in part, but then I shall know just as I also am known” (1
Corinthians 13:12).

6

Translations from the New King James Version.
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When Kusanagi recites the Corinthians in the final scene, the film comes full circle
in its psychoanalytic references. Whereas the Puppet Master compares Kusanagi’s identity
crisis to seeing in the dark, Kusanagi states that she has grown out of it due to her merging
with the Puppet Master. Then, the film concludes with Kusanagi transcending the mirror
stage. This is supported by the Puppet Master’s last-minute explanation of why he chose
Kusanagi as his host, which is because he believes he and Kusanagi are alike, almost as if
they are mirror images of each other (1:12:22-1:12:30). This remark frames the
amalgamation of the two characters as a Lacanian transcendence to wholeness, by which the
infant’s body and the mirror image converge into an authentic whole that is not a
misrecognition. Thus, the film concludes its underlying salvation story by means of forming
the dialectic of heterosexual coupling and of the infant and the mirror image, opening
possibilities for a Brave New World.

“Where Do I Go from Here?”
Thus far, I have critiqued the film’s narrative conclusion in a number of ways. I have
argued that the film, while providing Kusanagi with a seemingly radical mode of existence,
avoids the question of hybrid subjectivities by driving her into a state that presupposes a
stable material/immaterial binary. Drawing from motifs present within the “Manifesto,” I
underscored the film’s reliance on the figure of the goddess, which suggests an
incontaminable binary between humans and deity. Additionally, I highlighted how the film
forms a dialectical whole of its own by framing the amalgamation of Kusanagi and the
Puppet Master as a wedding and a departure from the Lacanian mirror stage. It seems that the
film presents a narrative of transformation and transcendence all the while remaining in the
familiar circuit of salvation stories.
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If the film suggests a way out of the epistemological quagmire of Euro-American
scientific culture, it could be through Kusanagi’s final departure into the abyss of the internet.
The cyborg has been contained in the obsolete narrative of wholeness, but her own narrative
extends beyond that which is presented to the audience. Perhaps she will achieve hybridity
well after the closing credits are over; we thus reenter the realm of imagination.
Kusanagi’s takeoff is instructive to our understandings of and interactions with
present-day cyborgs. As we continue to imagine possible renditions of cyborgs in science
fiction and in real life, Ghost in the Shell marks the political terminus of a certain cyborg in
1995. As much as Kusanagi’s final lines are spoken in anticipation of her new life, it is also
an invitation to ask how we can negotiate with our immediate discursive moment and the
archive underlying it.

Figures

Fig.1 and 2. Kusanagi escapes after executing assassination from Oshii Mamoru, Ghost in the
Shell, Shochiku, 1995, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sDR8Vw0ZY28&t=760s.
Accessed May 12, 2022.
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Fig.3 City views from Kusanagi’s apartment from Oshii Mamoru, Ghost in the Shell,
Shochiku, 1995, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sDR8Vw0ZY28&t=760s. Accessed
May 12, 2022.

Fig.4 Hand regard moment from Oshii Mamoru, Ghost in the Shell, Shochiku, 1995,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sDR8Vw0ZY28&t=760s. Accessed May 12, 2022.
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Fig.5 and 6 Kusanagi in an approximation of the fetal position from Oshii Mamoru, Ghost in
the Shell, Shochiku, 1995, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sDR8Vw0ZY28&t=760s.
Accessed May 12, 2022.

Fig.7 Kusanagi floating towards a mirror image of herself from Oshii Mamoru, Ghost in the
Shell, Shochiku, 1995, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sDR8Vw0ZY28&t=760s.
Accessed May 13, 2022.
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Fig.8 Falling angel from Oshii Mamoru, Ghost in the Shell, Shochiku, 1995,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sDR8Vw0ZY28&t=760s. Accessed May 12, 2022.
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